Alaska commercial salmon harvests since 1900/Alaska Department of Fish and Game
Who got the money?
A news analysis
One of the greatest Alaska stories never told centers on the multi-billion dollar bonanza that the combination of global warming and open-ocean salmon farming has delivered the 49th state’s commercial salmon fishing industry over the past 50 years.
Legacy media reporters are not about to touch this story because it runs contrary to the prevailing dogma that a warming planet is in all ways bad and because it would not please the various, do-gooder foundations and trusts that now help to fund much of today’s legacy and legacy-connected media.
Fifteen years ago, however, scientists weren’t shy about admitting to this reality.
Kaeriyama also warned that “biological interaction between wild and hatchery populations should be an important consideration in the sustainable management of Pacific salmon production based at the ecosystem level.”
That warning was ignored. Hatcheries helped to pump the Pacific full of pink and chum salmon in the years that followed. And by 2018, scientists were reporting there were more salmon in the Pacific than at any time in human history, although 40 percent of the biomass was made up of ocean-farmed chums and pinks, the smallest and least valuable of the species.
Still, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game was not shy in bragging about its involvement in helping to create a northern salmon boom even if some scientists were questioning whether Canadian and Pacific Northwest salmon are paying the price for the successes of Alaska, Russia and Japan in loading North Pacific pastures with hatchery fish.
The hatcheries account for about a third of this increase, leaving the wild fish component of the catch averaging about 121 million fish per year or about 33 percent more than the best decade of the past.
That decade spanned the years from 1930 to 1939 when the federally managed harvest in the Alaska Territory averaged 91 million salmon per year, or half of the total 2012-2021 harvest of 182 million. The biggest catch in the 1930s – 130 million salmon in 1936 – was about 71 percent of the yearly average for the decade from 2012 to 2021 in a state where average annual salmon harvests have grown steadily decade by decade.
In the years to follow, a 110 million harvest would come to be considered a bad year.
To date there has been no detailed accounting of how much money this boom poured into the bank accounts of salmon processors and commercial fishermen, but with average, annual payments to fishermen increasing by approximately $200 million to more than $800 million per year for decades, they alone appear to have benefitted to the tune of $10 billion or so thanks to climate change and the state’s open-ocean farming or what is disingenuously called “ranching.”
(Editor’s note: For simplicity, all dollar figures in this analysis have been inflation-corrected to October 2023 per the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation calculator.)
Together, the vagaries of nature and the works of man combined to turn an industry worth an average of $365.5 million per year to commercial fishermen from statehood until 1975 into an industry that paid them one and a half to three times that on average for every year in the nearly four decades that followed.
Ex-vessel prices, according to the state, are “the value of the first purchase of raw fish.” The state also tracks a second value – “wholesale prices” – that “represent a weighted average price per pound by species group, product group, area, species, and product” once processed in Alaska.
Year-to-year, there is considerable variation in Alaska ex-vessel versus wholesale prices, but in general, Alaska salmon tend to generate more revenue for largely Seattle-based processors – in this case about 66 percent more – than for Alaska commercial fishermen.
Global warming and hatchery farming of the ocean have been as good to these processors as they have to Alaska’s commercial fishermen. The processors were doing so well as the 1980s came to an end and the 1990s began that 4,500 Bristol Bay commercial fishermen accused them of price fixing and sued, arguing they’d underpaid fishermen to the tune of $764 million (in 2023 dollars) from 1989 through 1995.
After examining the market at the time and the prices being paid, an Anchorage Superior Court judge dismissed the lawsuit saying there was insufficient evidence of price fixing to submit to a jury, but that ruling was overturned by the Alaska Supreme Court and the case eventually went to trial.
After listening to about three months of testimony, it took an Anchorage jury less than five hours to decide that there was no evidence to support the accusations of price fixing. So ended the biggest boom days of this decades-long run of salmon bounty, though the benefits of global warming and hatcheries would continue to accrue.
Markets
The problem for Alaska fishermen and processors from the mid-1990s on has been that larger volumes of salmon to be canned and frozen do not necessarily translate into larger profits in a global market altered by technology.
As Fryer wrote of the situation at the time of the 1995 price-fixing lawsuit, “the inventory of frozen salmon in Japan was at record high levels in 1989 when the size of the Bristol Bay run more than doubled. The yen devalued, making American fish more expensive in the Japanese market and the Japanese economy started a downward trend, making the less expensive Hokkaido chums more in line with Japanese household budgets.
“In addition, farmed salmon, though still produced at modest levels, was gradually impacting the world market. Like a hurricane just over the edge of the horizon showing early warning mare’s tails, the changes to be created by farm fish were anticipated by few.”
Eventually, they grew their industry into a world power.
Norway, a country about two-tenths the size of Alaska, now produces almost three times as much salmon per year as Alaska produces in its best years. In 2023, when Alaska’s fourth-highest harvest on record amounted to 417,1287 metric tonnes, Norwegian farms exported 1.2 million tonnes, nearly three times as much despite a 2 percent decrease in production from the year before.
The value difference between the Norwegian fish and the Alaska fish is even greater than the difference in volume given that the Norwegians, long the world leaders in farmed salmon, grow most of their salmon to six pounds or more for slaughter into filets while Alaska fishermen catch tens of millions of five-pound and smaller salmon largely destined for cans, pouches or fish meal.
“The Norwegian Atlantic salmon industry is by far the world’s leading producer with exports of $7.6 billion in 2021,” the Cook Inlet Aquaculture Association (CIAA), one of Alaska’s struggling free-range, salmon farming operations reported last year. “By comparison, Alaska salmon catches were valued at $720 million in 2022.”
That is a more than ten-fold difference in value. Still, the huge volumes of low-value wild and semi-wild salmon now being harvested in Alaska have helped the state’s modern-day fishermen stay well ahead of those of yesteryear.
More fish at lower value still equals more revenue for Alaska commercial fishermen than they ever saw in the past. And there are a lot more fish.
Since 1980, there have been but two seasons when the harvest failed to top 100 million, and since 1990, there have been none. The decade of the ’50s when harvests averaged 41.4 million per year, and the two decades from 1960 to 1979 when harvests averaged about 50 million per year, are so long gone they are forgotten.
The current 10-year average harvest is more than four times larger than in 1950 and approaching four times larger than that of the 1960 to 1979 period. The volume of salmon has made up for the fact the fish aren’t worth nearly as much.
From 2014 to 2023, the 10-year average annual payment to fishermen for their catches came to approximately $560 million per year, according to Fish and Game data. That’s about a 53 percent increase over what fishermen earned in the 1960s and into the mid-1970s.
It is also a 53 percent increase shared by a smaller number of fishermen than were licensed to fish commercially in Alaska in 1973, the year before Alaska enacted its so-called Limited Entry law to restrict the number of fishermen allowed to harvest salmon.
Limited entry whittled the more than 22,000 people who held licenses to commercial fish in 1970 down to 16,264 who were considered serious enough fishermen to be granted limited entry permits. The permits number would further shrink to 14,536 by 2005, according to the then-director of the state’s Commercial Fishery Entry Commission (CFEC).
The number of salmon permits is now down under 14,000, according to the CFEC, meaning fewer people are slicing up the $560 million pie of today than were divvying up the $365.5 million pie of yesteryear.
So although the average, yearly salmon catch of nearly 185 million fish over the past 10 years has been worth only about $3 per salmon compared to the more than $13.50 per fish value for the salmon caught in 1960-1975, today’s fishermen do better than those of yesterday.
The approximately 14,000 permit holders are averaging $40,000 per permit in annual sales compared to 22,000 fishermen in the old days taking in, on average, about $16,600 each.
This more than two-fold increase in average earnings doesn’t come close to the state’s claimed 469 percent increase in salmon numbers, but it is significant. A warming North Pacific Ocean and Alaska’s hatcheries, which now produce about a third of the annual harvest, albeit of smallish pink salmon, have done these fishermen well.
Crisis in the fisheries
Despite this, an industry that has enjoyed a windfall of billions thanks to climate change and state-funded hatcheries has shared none of the wealth with Alaskans and is now in crisis and asking for state assistance.
The Alaska fishing industry, unlike the Alaska oil industry, pays little in taxes.
The tax-sharing program, meanwhile, leaves the state more than $10 million short of the funds necessary to manage and police the fisheries, according to a 2022 ISER study. The funding shortfall is made up by the state’s so-called “general fund.”
Were Alaskans paying taxes, this would create a situation in which taxpayers were directly subsidizing a state industry, but since Alaskans aren’t paying taxes, the money comes out of the oil revenues, earnings from the Alaska Permanent Fund and other taxes that cover the cost of state government.
None of the windfall collected by commercial salmon fishermen and processors thanks to environmental changes and what were originally state-funded hatcheries has gone back to the general fund, and now the hatcheries, like the processors, are in trouble.
They are in debt to the state to the tune of about $90 million, and some commercial fishermen involved in the “associations” that today run the hatcheries are just beginning to realize that they could potentially be held responsible for paying off this debt.
One of those fishermen, commercial seiner Tom Buchanan from the coastal community of Seward in September launched a petition aimed at stopping the assessments now imposed on CIAA members or, as he put it, stopping CIAA from “digging me deeper into debt with more loans for worthless, often detrimental projects.
CIAA was last summer using so-called “cost recovery” fisheries to outfish its association members and still wasn’t pulling in enough revenue to cover the high costs of operating hatcheries, which is the exact problem the state of Alaska faced in the 1990s.
“By the later 1990s, the Division of Commercial Fisheries neither funded nor operated salmon hatcheries.”
The facilities had been turned over to private, nonprofit associations run by commercial fishermen who legally committed to pay the operating costs of those facilities. The original plan was to tax their individual catches to pay the costs, but when it became clear those taxes would be onerous, the state agreed to let the hatcheries operate so-called “cost recovery” fisheries to capture and sell hatchery fish.
The cost-recovery harvest of 13.4 million salmon was nearly three times the 4.9 million claimed for cost-recovery a decade earlier and reflects the low prices paid for pink salmon, the smallest of the species but the most cost-effective to ranch. The cost-recovery fishery in 2013 represented about 5 percent of the total harvest of 99.7 million salmon of which 93 percent were pinks.
The Sound hatcheries appear financially stable, but CIAA is another matter, and its fugre does not look good given the downward trend in Alaska salmon values. The decline in value of the state’s salmon is recorded in the $1.2 billion in annual, ex-vessel payments Knapp cited in 1992 slipping to approximately $674 million per year from 1992 to 2008 and now down to about $560 million per year since then, according to state data.
This is a troubling change across the board.
The less paid fishermen the less the state collects in taxes, the less fishing communities get in revenue sharing, the less revenue is available to cover the costs of managing and policing the commercial fisheries, and the more the state must subsidize the industry.
Some hatchery advocates think they can produce their way out of this predicament by pumping even more farmed fish into the North Pacific, but the marine pastures already appear to be at carrying capacity if not beyond.
The Conservancy claims “the major causes of the region-wide declines in Chinook productivity and abundance are predominately due to factors in the marine rearing and migratory environment. Global warming and climate change along with massive releases of hatchery pink and chum salmon from Japan, Russia, and Alaska adversely impact marine food webs.”
“Overall, pink salmon represented approximately 74 percent of total salmon abundance in 2018/2019,” the scientists reported. “Most pink salmon are of natural origin, but abundance of hatchery pink salmon during 2005 to 2015 was greater than abundance of wild chum salmon and approximately equal to abundance of wild sockeye salmon.”
The NPAFC is a treaty organization established by the Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean with the U.S., Russia, Canada, Japan and South Korea as signatories.
For better or worse, the commission has no real powers. It can only advise the member nations, and it is unlikely the three leaders in hatchery production – the U.S., Japan and Russia – would be willing to scale back their open-ocean farming.
Japan, which was the pioneer in the business, has already reduced its hatchery releases significantly and would likely balk at a request to do more. A cash-strapped Russia struggling to overcome Western economic sanctions tied to its war on Ukraine has no incentive to cooperate with the countries backing those sanctions. And nearly all of the U.S. hatchery production comes from Alaska where the hatcheries are firmly entrenched as local economic mainstays.
And then there is the state of Alaska which remains fixated on producing more salmon when the market is indicating that what the state should be fixated on is getting more value out of the salmon it already produces.
Editor’s note: This is story is an updated version of the original. It was edited on April 9, 2024 to add some historical information on salmon and climate change in the early 2000s.
Categories: News

My cousin recommended this page to me, but no one else seems to know my concerns as well as he does, so I’m not sure whether he wrote this post. You are amazing; I appreciate you.
Quality research and reporting Craig. Enjoyed reading. So, we in the Eastern Bering Sea Pollock fishery are dealing with a possible new Hard Cap on chum salmon driven primarily by the Western Alaska tribal organizations (including AVCP, TCC, Yukon and Kusko Inter-tribal Fish Commissions) who are experiencing the impacts to very large run failures of Western Alaska (AYK) river systems. Genetic sampling of the bycaught chums in the directed EBS pollock fishery by Auke Bay Lab genetics folks (NOAA Fisheries) show that 65 – 85% of the chums encountered by the pollock fleet are from North and South Asia origin. Mainly Northern Japanese and Western Bering Sea Russian hatchery production. Russian hatchery production of chum releases are growing at an alarming rate. I guess it would be great if you could take a look at the ecological impacts of these “Putin fish’ using our EBS shelf environment to prey on feed. Do these Asian hatchery fish compete with chums out on the EBS Shelf region for prey? Is this causing a negative impact to the depressed Western Alaska chum stocks? Brent Paine, United Catcher Boats
Good questions, Brent. Nobody seems to know. From what the Japanese are seeing, it would appear they think their hatchery fish are losing out to competition.
And there’s another big question here nobody has evee raised to my knowledge: Russian bycatch. The Marine Stewardship Council review of the Russian pollock fishery noted that “publicly-available information on bycatch is generally lacking for the trawl fisheries,” and then added this little tidbit:
“During review of this report, stakeholders opined that Chinook salmon
bycatch in the North Kurils is small-scale and seasonal, occurring primarily in the winter months of November
to December. Annual test fishery data from 1996 to 1998 indicates that, on average, 5.7% of trawl catch
consisted of Chinook salmon in those months (KamchatNIRO 1997 to 1999). Unfortunately, these test fisheries
did not continue into summer months, when Chinook salmon migrate, and other data was not found to back
up stakeholder feedback regarding the seasonality of Chinook salmon bycatch. In the absence of adequate
information indicating otherwise, the Kuril Islands fishery is rated “moderate” concern for fishing mortality of
Chinook salmon.”
If I remember right, our all-species bycatch in the American pollock fishery is something around 3 to 5 percent with the percentages of chum and Chinook bycatch some sliver of that. I don’t think I’ever since a number for the percentage of Chinook or chum catch as a matter of the whole? You have any idea of what that number is?
I can’t imagine a bycatch of approximately six Chinook for every 100 pollock in the U.S. fishery. Given we measure pollock harvests in metric tons, not fish, it’s hard to do any back of the envelope math here, but in terms of fish numbers that pollock harvest has to be in the hundreds of millions of fish and even at 100 million. you’d be bycatching 6 million Chinook at 6 percent.
Almost makes me wonder if that MSC statement isn’t wrong. Almost 6 percent would seem insanely high.
You state that hatcheries contribute about 30% of statewide salmon harvest. That’s a bit misleading if you were to isolate just PWS harvest and what percentage of that huge pink harvest are hatchery clones. Not sure but a wild guess would be nearly 75%. That’s the problem genetically. The entire natural salmon ecosystem of PWS has been burned by overproduction. Hatcheries were not commissioned to produce record quantities of Salmon, but to supplement or enhance wild production.
Cost recovery, in ways, takes Fish Tax from communities that may have needs while hatcheries justify added production construction through cost recovery funds. More oversight needed of hatchery finances. Follow the money, and it seems Craig is doing just that.
I cited the contribution to the “statewide” harvest, not the Prince William Sound harvest. Bristol Bay sockeye are in that statewide mix as are Southest pinks, which can reproduce naturally at significant levels some years. That said, I think your guess as to hatchery fish spawning in PWS streams is high, although for some specific streams it is also low.
“The proportion of hatchery‐origin spawners (stray rate) in 27 sampled PWS streams ranged from 0% to 98% with higher (stray) values generally associated with smaller populations and streams located closer to hatchery release sites.” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8965367/#:~:text=Agreement%20between%20the%20first%20and,fish%20(Table%20%E2%80%8B2).
Honestly, I admit to being surprised they found streams without hatchery strays. It might be due to limited sampling because there is no doubt a huge stray rate. That study does, however, lend some evidence to your observations as to the ecosystem being “burned,” ie:
The results “suggest a strong negative effect of hatchery‐origin on an individual’s reproductive success…We measured a reduction in fitness of ~50% for hatchery strays spawning in streams for the even‐year and still lower for odd‐year lineages.”
Of course, it could be that “offspring of hatchery strays may be harvested at higher rates in the commercial fishery than offspring of natural‐origin fish, due to differences in run timing and fishery management.,” as the authors of the study noted.
One would think that someone might have wanted to figure this out before we began dumping so many little hatchery pinks into the Sound, but somehow hatchery operators have managed to skirt the Environmental Impact Statement requirements of any other business dumping large volumes of organic material into the sound, and of course, those same hatcheries are now in a battle with the state Department of Environmental Conservation which wants to regulate the organic material that accumulates beneath the net pens in which they now grow young fish to increase their survival odds so as to out compete wild fish when they are released.
The state of Alaska (and the private equity hedge funds driving the system we see today) are the real “winners” since they are receiving interest on their billions in low interest loans to hatcheries, and comm fish mafia. The losers are the residents of AK that have had their local streams closed to fishing so the big boys can vacation in Mexico each year and keep up their mortgage on the house in Washington state so the wife and kiddos can bike to the local organic market while Alaskans have their freezers bare.